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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4475
In recent years, natural and man-made disasters have 
confronted the international community with its most 
demanding reconstruction challenges since the aftermath 
of World War II. Managing the inflow of resources and 
spending those resources well have proven to be two of 
the main difficulties in such reconstruction projects, 
particularly after large-scale disasters. A central dilemma 
of the public financial management of reconstruction 
is the need for very high levels of accountability to 
demonstrate fiduciary credibility, while at the same 
time ensuring the rapid implementation of recovery 
programs. This paper identifies options and lessons for 
managing post-disaster reconstruction finance in three 
key areas: (i) the establishment of special institutions 
This paper— a joint product of the East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (EASPR) and the PREM 
Public Sector (PRMPS) Units—is part of an effort to better understand the economic impacts of natural disasters and to 
help manage reconstruction processes effectively. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at wfengler@worldbank.org, aihsan@worldbank.org, and kkaiser@
worldbank.org. 
to manage the reconstruction process; (ii) the selection 
of public financial management systems with respect 
to the application of country systems, special fiduciary 
arrangements, or donor/NGO execution; and (iii) 
monitoring and evaluation systems. The authors 
synthesize the phasing of assistance and approaches in 
eight recent post-natural disaster reconstruction efforts 
(Aceh-Indonesia, Yogyakarta-Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Pakistan, Colombia, Grenada, and Honduras) 
to help guide the priorities and options for future 
instances of public financial management for disaster 
reconstruction. The paper also compares the challenges 
posed by post-conflict versus post-natural disaster public 
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  2I.  Introduction 
1.  The past three years have presented the development community with some of 
its most demanding reconstruction challenges since the aftermath of World War II. While 
post-conflict reconstruction remains a priority in parts of Africa, the Middle East and 
South Asia, reconstruction after natural disasters has received equal attention, particularly 
after the tsunami in December 2004. Over the period from July 2006 to June 2007, there 
have been a total of 366 disasters—almost four times more than in 1975. These disasters 
included earthquakes, floods, landslides, wild fires, droughts, wind storms, epidemics and 
extreme temperatures, and affected almost 200,000 people, killing 18,000 and producing 
damage valued at almost US$30 billion.
1 Recent projections on the rapidity of climate 
change will further increase the number and intensity of natural disasters (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group, 2006).  
2.  The World Bank and other development partners have been involved in post-
disaster reconstruction in response to the devastation resulting from the recent tsunami in 
Indonesia (Aceh), Sri Lanka, the Maldives and India, and also from the earthquakes in 
Pakistan and Indonesia (Yogyakarta/Central Java). All these activities came in addition to 
other large-scale post-conflict reconstruction programs in Afghanistan, East Timor, Haiti, 
Sudan and several other countries, most recently Lebanon. In some cases such as Aceh, 
the legacy of conflict and natural disaster were overlapping. While both contexts often 
trigger the need for a rapid scaling-up of support and are characterized by weak capacity 
environments, responses may be subject to important differences. A cross-cutting theme 
in both instances, however, was the need to strengthen (and in many cases establish) 
effective modalities of public financial management in accordance with local prevailing 
capacities and fiduciary risks. 
3.  The World Bank’s reconstruction and mitigation portfolio (related to natural-
disasters) has also been increasing sharply since the 1980s. During period of 1984 and 
2005 there were 528 projects worth US$26.3 billion to support disaster-related activities. 
These represent 9.4 percent of all World Bank loan commitments since 1984. Most of 
them are Emergency Recovery Loans (ERLs), and include International Development 
Association (IDA) credits and grants (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). 
4.  In most disasters, the available domestic resources are not sufficient to meet the 
financial and human needs. The impact of disasters in developing countries is typically 
disproportionately greater in terms of GDP and government revenues. Consequently, 
international donor agencies are frequently called upon to finance reconstruction in post-
disaster and post-conflict countries. In the case of large-scale natural disasters such as the 
Asian tsunami, private contributions were also an important part of the reconstruction 
program.  In these contexts, international agencies such as the World Bank are often 
called upon to provide support in terms of reconstruction financing and experience, 
                                                 
1 Source: ‘EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database’, July 2007, Universite Catholique 
de Lowain, Brussels, Belgium. 
  1international good practice, impact evaluations, and technical task of with coordinating 
the various donors and agencies engaged in the process. 
5.  Spending these significant financial resources well has been a key concern in all 
these reconstruction episodes. Appropriate arrangements for Public Financial 
Management & Accountability (PFMA) are increasingly viewed as a crucial ingredient in 
ensuring that reconstruction proceeds with integrity in a timely and effective manner, 
while also adequately managing fiduciary risk. 
6.  The international community has increasingly emphasized the performance of 
Public Financial Management (PFM) systems to enhance the use of domestic resources in 
developing countries and to underpin the scaling-up and effectiveness of aid. 
Strengthening of country financial management systems and donor harmonization have 
both emerged as key priorities in enhancing aid effectiveness, including through budget 
support.  The recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework 
has developed an approach based on a systemic diagnosis in order to identify weaknesses 
in PFM and the use of performance indicators to design reforms and monitor 
improvements.
2 
7.  This paper focuses on special considerations for strengthening PFM 
arrangements in post-disaster environments that have yet to receive systematic attention. 
This paper’s objective is threefold: (i) to present key features of PFM in post-disaster 
environments and the choice of PFM modalities, and (ii) to highlight the similarities and 
differences between PFM in post-disaster and post-conflict environments, and (iii) to 
present summary issues and options that need to be considered in the context of post-
disaster reconstruction. 
8.  The application of sound fiduciary principles is very challenging in post-disaster 
situations, because the need for speed often overrides more conventional mechanisms for 
planning and implementation of budgets. In addition, post-disaster and post-conflict 
situations often entail the engagement of many public and private development partners, 
necessitating the need to ensure that all these parties work together effectively towards 
the objective of reconstruction. Mitigating the risk of corruption represents a crucial 
element in maintaining donor commitment and supporting the legitimacy of the overall 
reconstruction process.
3 We examine how recent PFM arrangements in eight cases of 
post-natural disaster reconstruction—Aceh-Indonesia, Yogyakarta-Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Pakistan, Colombia, Grenada, and Honduras—have contributed to the 
management of reconstruction finance, highlighting key issues and considerations, 
                                                 
2 The multi-donor PEFA initiative performance measurement framework covers 28 indicators, with an 
additional three to assess donor practices (see PEFA, 2005) across the full budget cycle. 
3 Recent PFM work has also focused on identifying appropriate reform frameworks for low capacity 
contexts.  For example, the platform approach to Public Financial Management and Accountability 
(PFMA) is being piloted in a number of countries as reforms to date have often proved unwieldy, poorly 
coordinated, and unsustainable. The approach aims to achieve increasing levels (‘platforms’) of PFMA 
competence over a manageable timeframe.  Each platform establishes a clear basis for launching the next, 
based on the premise that a certain level of PFMA competence is required to enable further progress to take 
place (see DFID, 2005). 
  2together with a variety of approaches for strengthening these arrangements. Our approach 
seeks to adopt a more systematic assessment, such as comparing prioritization and 
sequencing of post-disaster PFM arrangements with conventional perspectives used in 
assessing PFM systems and processes. From a comparative perspective, this paper also 
highlights similarities to and differences with purely post-conflict reconstruction, drawing 
selectively on examples in Afghanistan, East Timor, Haiti and Sudan.  
9.  Section II of this paper analyzes the difference between post-disaster and post-
conflict reconstruction and sets out the basic phases in the reconstruction process. In 
Section III, we analyze three major reconstruction management and fiduciary issues that 
have been critical in recent post-disaster reconstruction experiences: (i) establishment of 
special agencies, (ii) PFM modalities, and (iii) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
systems.  Section IV analyzes recent country experience against this framework. Section 
V presents some lessons on strengthening PFM arrangements for reconstruction based on 
the comparative experiences. 
II. Managing the Reconstruction Process 
10.  The growing engagement of both governmental and non-governmental 
international development stakeholders has generated an expanding literature focusing on 
lessons learned and providing guidance for future instances of engagement (see World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). A number of contributions have also 
focused on very specific topics such as the preparation of damage and loss assessments, 
participatory planning, independent/demand-side monitoring, and monitoring and 
evaluation systems (Agustina 2007, Fengler 2007). More limited attention has been given 
to providing a more integrated perspective on PFM for reconstruction, particularly one 
that amends mainstream good practice (PEFA, 2005). 
11.  This paper focuses on post-disaster reconstruction, but also provides a 
comparative perspective on post-conflict situations. Post-disaster and post-conflict 
reconstruction episodes share several similarities and the more recent post-disaster 
reconstruction experiences have been informed by the deeper knowledge of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  But just as there are similarities, so there are also important differences. 
The next part of this paper focuses on these differences and similarities before analyzing 
the phases of post-disaster reconstruction and presenting a “protocol of events”. 
 
Post-disaster versus post-conflict reconstruction 
12.  While post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction share the characteristics of 
immediacy and scale, notable differences exist. Natural disasters are typically unforeseen, 
while post-conflict reconstruction, often signaled by a peace agreement, offers some lead-
time. However, even in post-conflict situations the call for reconstruction will require 
swift action, particularly when domestic and international resources aim to stabilize a 
fragile peace (Table 1). 
  3Table 1 Post-disaster versus post-conflict reconstruction  
Differences  Similarities 
Post-disaster  Post-conflict 
• Unforeseeable sudden 
event 
• Often foreseeable 
• Government system 
typically functioning 
regularly pre-disaster 
• Government system 
associated with and often 
weakened by conflict 
• Donors need to respond fast, 
often with large volumes of aid 
• Set-up of new reconstruction 
agencies 
• Use of World Bank’s financial 
instruments (e.g., MDTF, 
ERL) 
• More linear 
reconstruction path 
• High likelihood of falling 
back into conflict 
 
13.  Conflict often weakens the administrative and service-delivery capacity of states 
more than natural disasters. However, large-scale disasters, particularly if they affect a 
large proportion of a country, may also overwhelm in-country systems. Notably, post-
conflict situations always carry the risk of unresolved political issues and a return to 
hostilities, making the reconstruction process fraught with uncertainty.
4  In the two most 
tsunami-affected regions, the coastal regions of Aceh and Sri Lanka, conflict and disaster 
overlap. However, in contrast to Sri Lanka, following the signing of the Helsinki Peace 
Accord on August 15, 2005, Aceh has remained on track towards a durable peace 
settlement.  
14.  In post-conflict countries, the reconstruction challenge is often compounded by 
the need to rebuild a functioning public administration.  While the immediate priority is 
to re-establish key public services, governments often at the same time need to establish 
“core” public functions such as PFM and the civil service. This often entails a trade-off 
between speed and sustainability. In both, post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction, 
multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) have emerged as one vehicle for channeling and 
coordinating reconstruction resources.   
 
The phases of post-disaster reconstruction 
15.  When a disaster strikes, governments need to rapidly mobilize and deploy a 
significant level of public resources for relief and reconstruction. Whereas the relief 
phase is typically concerned with providing immediate support, the reconstruction phase 
typically involves a trajectory of returning to “normality”. Recovery management 
includes the implementation of capital projects (e.g., housing, schools, clinics), as well as 
re-establishing basic public services in a sustainable manner.  Similar to post-conflict 
settings, post-disaster reconstruction needs to bridge the gap between the relief and 
reconstruction. The reconstruction phase itself will also be subject to prioritizing certain 
types of reconstruction such as housing, livelihoods, physical and social infrastructure 
(Figure 1). 
                                                 
4 Estimates are that about half of peace agreements are associated with a reversion to conflict (see Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2006).  
  4•  Phase I is characterized by the relief effort and is typically led by the national 
government (in some cases led by the military), together with UN agencies. During 
this phase, which usually lasts several weeks, planning for reconstruction begins. 
•  Phase II presents the transition from an emergency to a full-scale reconstruction 
program. Early reconstruction starts while emergency relief activities still continue. 
This is a critical phase for the success of the whole reconstruction program. In many 
reconstruction programs the transition between emergency relief and reconstruction 
is poorly managed. This can create an unnecessary gap before reconstruction 
activities start and corresponding frustration among those affected. For example, 
frustration in post-tsunami Aceh ran high six months after the natural disaster when 
core relief activities were being phased out before most reconstruction activities had 
begun.  
•  Phase III represents the fully fledged reconstruction program of which each 
component has its own sequence. For instance, in India the focus of the first 
reconstruction year was on re-establishing livelihoods, particularly of affected 
fishing communities. By contrast, in Aceh and Nias the first year was dominated by 
housing reconstruction, followed by a focus on infrastructure (see BRR NAD-Nias 
and International Partners, 2005). 
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Managing the reconstruction process – A protocol of events 
16.  The immediate wake of a disaster (or conflict) typically comprises a number of 
stages that proceed in rapid succession: (i) damage/loss, or needs assessments, (ii) donor 
conference, (iii) development of a reconstruction strategy (some elements of which may 
have already been presented at the donor conference), and (iv) the coming into force of 
implementation modules and the integration into the budget cycle (Figure 2). 























17.  Damage/loss and needs assessments.
5  Damage/loss and needs assessments 
have become vital instruments for government and donors in estimating the level of 
damage, mobilizing resources, and designing implementation arrangements. These 
assessments are often carried out by the host governments together with joint donor 
missions, typically led by the World Bank, the United Nations, and/or regional 
development banks. 
18.  Damage/loss and needs assessments are related concepts but their methodology 
is fundamentally different. Damage/loss assessments account for the loss of assets and 
the loss of flow of production of goods and services, as well as any temporary effects on 
the main macroeconomic variables subsequent to the event. Meanwhile, needs 
assessments calculate the  financing requirements for reconstruction, mainly through 
public channels, and do not necessarily reflect the damage/losses. Needs greatly depend 
on the availability of resources, the duration of the recovery period, the government’s 
own policies and the level of insurance coverage. Thus, the monetary figures for needs 
assessments can be higher or lower than those for damage/loss assessments depending on 
the underlying determinants of need (Table 2).   
                                                 
5 Damage/loss assessments are mostly applied in the aftermath of natural disasters while needs assessments 
are frequently used to estimate financing requirements in the post-conflict situation. The Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has developed a standard methodology to 
assess damage and losses after natural disasters (see ECLAC, 2003). Needs assessments take a broader 
costing approach and include institutional, policy and infrastructure needs. In post-conflict reconstruction 
needs assessments predominantly focus on the costs of state-building (see UNDP/UNDG/World Bank, 
2004). 
  6Table 2  Needs assessments versus damage/loss assessments 
Needs can be higher than 
damage/loss, because:   
•  Building back better, i.e. beyond minimum services 
(that existed prior the disaster) 
•  Emergency/transitional costs; incl. pure logistics of 
delivering reconstruction 
•  Inflation 
Needs can be lower than 
damage/loss, because:  
•  Fewer public services are needed in the case of large 
loss of life or migration 
•  Insurance, the private sector, or households cover 
part of the costs  
19.  Donor conference. The impact of a disaster or conflict often far exceeds a 
developing country’s capacity and resources to independently manage recovery.  And as 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, capacity can also be overwhelmed even in developed 
countries. Financial assistance from international donors in these situations often plays a 
significant role. Donor conferences have become an important mechanism for mobilizing 
such international assistance. In such a forum, the preliminary estimates of damage/loss 
and needs assessments are presented, together with initial key policies of the government 
for directing the reconstruction (including the potential establishment of an MDTF). 
20.  Reconstruction strategy. The preparation of a comprehensive reconstruction 
strategy includes decisions on the institutional and financial arrangements of the 
reconstruction program. Depending on the scale of the disaster or the capacity of the 
national government, establishing a separate reconstruction agency is one option, 
particularly if the reconstruction effort receives continuous national and international 
attention. In this phase, governments typically also take decisions on establishing 
MDTFs. 
21.  PFM strategy. The next important step is the implementation of the 
reconstruction program in conjunction with the government’s budget system. In most 
reconstruction episodes, particularly the largest, reconstruction financing flows both 
through the government’s budget as well as outside the regular mechanism (“off-
budget”). In many cases, countries face a trade-off between rigorous planning and rapid 
action. The regular budget system is too rigid to allow for a sufficiently flexible response. 
In contrast, off-budget mechanisms face increased fiduciary risks and usually complicate 
coordination. The following section elaborates on the special considerations for 
reconstruction PFM.     
III.  Key Issues and Options for Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
22.  The initial preparation for post-disaster recognition will need to address three 
factors that will be critical for success during implementation. The first concerns the 
institutional management of the reconstruction process, particularly with respect to the 
establishment of special agencies. A second issue concerns the capacity and modalities 
for PFM.  For example, the recent Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation 
highlights that problems in procurement are prone to be a significant weakness in project 
implementation (see World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). Poor preparation 
  7in terms of PFM approaches can also lead to a gap between emergency project approvals 
and effectiveness. Finally, effective and timely monitoring and evaluation systems are 
critical for assessing the progress of reconstruction, and providing early warning signals 
for corrective action as needed. 
The role of special reconstruction agencies 
23.  Special agencies have been a core feature in many reconstruction processes, 
particularly after large-scale natural disasters.  This raises three sets of questions: 
•  Should disaster-affected countries set up a special agency? If not, what are the 
alternatives? 
•  What should be the functions of a special agency? 
•  How to ensure that such special agency ends its mandate on time? 
24.  The experience suggests that the optimal choice of agency depends on the scale 
of the disaster and reconstruction program (the larger the disaster, the more partners and 
the likely need for a special agency), country size, what is the location of the disaster 
logistically (the more remote, the more likely the need for a special agency), and the pre-
existing capacity of central and local agencies to handle the special 
spending/implementation demand of reconstruction.  It is especially important to clearly 
delineate the exact roles and responsibilities of these types of agencies vis-à-vis particular 
functions (planning, coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) and 
particular sectors/line agencies (e.g., education, housing). 
25.  There are several possible options with regard to the institutional arrangements 
for managing reconstruction (Table 3).
6 Two models that are commonly adopted: (a) 
integrate a new agency into an existing ministerial system usually in the form of a 
coordination body, or (b) create a completely separate agency with specific authorities 
and responsibilities. The government may have strong leadership in post-disaster 
reconstruction and often plays a leading role. Conversely, in post-conflict settings the 
government role is frequently weak, often requiring international intervention, for 
example through the United Nations. 
                                                 
6 Institutional arrangement refers to an institution or agency which is established in responding to post-
disaster and/or post-conflict reconstruction and that usually has a limited period of life. It is unlike regular 
disaster management institution which is usually part of government function and responsible for disaster 
preparedness, promoting disaster prevention/risk reduction, and integrating disaster risk management into 
national development strategy (see Demeter, 2007). 
  8Table 3 Managing the reconstruction process – Institutional options and considerations  
Institutional 
Options 






• Most independent; and fully 
focused on reconstruction 
effort 
• Possible establishment of 
special mechanism for 
resource allocation, 
procurement and staffing  
• The task can be effectively 
addressed 
• Takes time to clarify roles and responsibilities 
of the agency  
• Possible disconnect from other government 
activities 
• May lack local ownership 
• Can take a life of its own and is difficult to 
phase out 
• Advisable in large scale and/or 
localized reconstruction 
episodes if agency has decision-
making authority 
• Sunset clauses are critical to 
avoid the agency taking a life of 









• Planning and budgeting, and 
oversight systems are in place 
• Established links with the 
international community 
• Sufficient implementation 
capacity  
• The task may not be effectively addressed  
• Risk of lacking independence and local 
ownership/ leadership 
• Civil service rules impede recruitment of 
professional staffs from outside 
• Advisable in small countries or 
governments with established 
track record and strong 
administration to manage 











• Full local ownership  
• Rehabilitation of sectors 
corresponds to most of the 
decentralized functions if 
country is very decentralized  
• Provincial and local governments could be 
overburdened due to (i) losses from the 
disaster, and (ii) inadequate capacity to 
manage a large reconstruction program  
• Civil service rules impede recruitment from 
outside 
• Potential fiduciary risks as existing 
government system may not adequately 
address reconstruction challenges 
• Advisable if reconstruction 
effort is of manageable scale,  
local governments are strong 
and already empowered through 
decentralization   
• If central agencies lead the 
reconstruction process in the 
early phase local governments 







• Ensuring the existence of 
government and 
administration 
• Access to international 
community 
• May lack local support 
• Lack of understanding of local needs 
• An option if the government 
and administrative functions 
have collapsed  
• This option is only preferred for 
a short-term transition 
26.  The reconstruction agencies or coordination boards, which are established to 
oversee and guide the overall reconstruction process, have three main functions: 
coordinating, monitoring, and implementing.  
•  Coordinating is a core function since the reconstruction work is often large and 
complex, requires a multi-sector approach, and involves multitude of players 
(government, donors, NGOs) that cannot be effectively managed by the existing 
government structure. Coordination is critical to avoid overlap and unnecessary loss 
of resources through facilitation, better information and communication.  
•  Monitoring is essential in the reconstruction process to ensure urgent needs have 
been addressed by sufficient funding and that resources are used effectively and reach 
the intended community. Since funds are likely to come from multiple sources and 
are often outside the government budgetary system, the regular government 
monitoring system may not be sufficient. The situation on the ground changes 
rapidly, so monitoring often guides and informs many important policy decisions.    
•  Implementing could be an optional role in special cases where the reconstruction 
project is large and complex and the capacity of government is not sufficient to 
  9undertake such a large-scale project. It is important to note that this function is not to 
perform regular service-delivery functions. However, to date there is only limited 
experience of reconstruction agencies being given an implementation role.  
27.  There are a number of compelling arguments for separating the functions of 
coordination and monitoring from implementation. First, since these agencies are 
typically created from scratch they have no operational capacity or experience in 
implementation. Second, if experienced line agencies or local governments are by-passed 
they may feel they have only limited buy-in in the reconstruction process. Third, 
establishing separate new bureaucracies for implementation may create incentives for 
these bureaucracies to be perpetuated and hinder their eventual phasing-out. Finally, 
assigning the new agency with implementation could undermine its monitoring role and 
leadership. 
PFM modalities: Country systems, emergency procedures, donor/NGO execution 
28.  Both multilateral donors, such as the World Bank, and bilateral donors have 
increasingly emphasized the importance of country systems in channeling donor support.  
In post-disaster reconstruction there are often challenges in using country systems 
exclusively, mainly because the reconstruction and budget cycles rarely match.  In 
addition, large-scale disasters also trigger significant non-governmental support which is 
typically channeled “off-budget”. Questions arising from post-disaster budgeting include: 
•  What should be the balance between using country versus special/donor-executive 
procedures? 
•  What is the role of “off-budget” mechanisms? 
29.  These choices will depend on a rapid assessment of the existing country 
systems, with a special emphasis on guaranteeing that resources are spent in a timely 
manner for the purposes for which they were intended.  A number of reasons may suggest 
the need for greater flexibility relative to standard central or sub-national government 
planning, budgeting, implementing, and monitoring procedures.  Foremost, it may not be 
easy to align the timing of the reconstruction spending with the typical annual budgeting 
and appropriations cycle.  While governments may have emergency procedures in place, 
they are often untested. 
30.  Typically reconstruction expenditures will place a heavy emphasis on capital 
investment spending, and some special spending to rapidly rebuild social services (e.g., 
special provision of teachers and doctors).  A more general problem in any process of 
public expenditure is ensuring that capital and recurrent budgeting are adequately 
integrated, in particular to ensure that effective management of these assets and their 
maintenance is ensured (see Sarraf, 2005).  Given that the emphasis of reconstruction is 
on rapidly rebuilding, and building new infrastructure to avert risks associated with future 
natural disasters, special emphasis will need to be placed on transferring future ownership 
and responsibility of these new assets.  Reconstruction processes often create assets that 
will need to be maintained by the public sector (e.g., schools, roads, clinics to be 
managed and maintained by national or sub-national entities) or private agents (e.g., 
  10housing).  Both during the reconstruction phase and the transition back to “normality”, 
policy makers must seek adequate capacity and accountability for asset management 
functions. 
31.  The urgency and volume of reconstruction expenditures mean that special 
emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that resources are spent for their intended 
purposes, without grinding implementation to a halt.  International taxpayers and private 
donors will likely seek to ensure that resources are not subject to waste and corruption.  
Appropriate prioritization in this regard will depend on how vulnerable the operating 
environment and country systems are to these type of risks.  Besides ensuring that both 
country and donor executive PFM systems have adequate controls, independent 
monitoring structures and complaints procedures will often need to be strengthened, for 
example in coordination with the special reconstruction agencies. 
32.  Good PFM practices apply in post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction. For 
instance, the reconstruction budget should be credible, meaning that the resources 
promised for reconstruction are actually delivered and used for the intended purposes 
within a given timeframe. Also, accountability for reconstruction to the target population 
and the financial sources is critical.  However, post-disaster and post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts demand different treatment from regular budget cycles and 
procedures.  This is because a speedier and more flexible response in a crowded 
environment of multiple actors is necessary. In short, reconstruction budgets often need 
to be drawn up from scratch, need to operate outside regular national or sub-national 
budgets, and need to allow for a speedier implementation of projects (Box 1). 
Box 1 What is different about reconstruction budgeting? 
•  Speed.  Reconstruction is typically faced with significant time pressures and finite duration. 
Progress is measured on a month-by-month basis, not an annual basis as in regular projects. The 
need for a swift response means that the time periods for project preparation, budget approval 
and procurement need to be significantly shortened.  
•  Flexibility. Disasters or peace settlements rarely occur in sync with the budgetary process. In 
order to respond to such events, most governments have funds for immediate emergencies but 
often lack procedures needed to establish fast-track funding for the immediate recovery.  Once 
budgets are approved, emergency-recovery situations demand a greater flexibility to reallocate 
funds within certain limits. In post-disaster environments, conditions change so rapidly that 
waiting until the national budget revision takes place would create unacceptable delays. 
•  Multiple actors. After large-scale disasters and high-profile conflicts, many government and 
non-government actors, often with limited expertise in the affected region or country, want to 
engage in the reconstruction. Aceh, a region that had been isolated before the tsunami, now has 
more than 300 institutions supporting the reconstruction effort. These institutions often use 
different budget mechanisms to channel their funds (often off-budget) and contribute to the 
reconstruction program.  
33.  The main challenge in managing reconstruction finance is to integrate the 
specific reconstruction needs and conditions (speed, flexibility, multiple actors) into 
regular country systems in order to meet the highest fiduciary standards. In almost all 
  11reconstruction episodes there has been some degree of adjustment to the regular 
budgetary process (Section III). The degree of this adjustment depends on the scale of the 
reconstruction effort, as well as the strength and flexibility of the respective country 
systems. Table 4 summarizes the main features of standard budget processes and their 
possible adjustment in reconstruction episodes.
7  
Table 4 Regular and reconstruction budget cycles 
  Regular budget cycle  
(PEFA-principles) 
Reconstruction financing 
Planning  • Builds on past budget performance 
evaluation 
• Includes macro-framework based 
on economic outlook 
• Builds on a damage/needs assessment 
• Needs to focus on rapid action while avoiding delays 
associated with standard annual planning cycles  
• Reconstruction agency/board may take on a special role 
Budget 
Preparation 
• Detailed vetting of projects by MoF 
and line ministries 
• Approval by parliament 
• Budgets are established from scratch 
• Needs high degree of flexibility, and anticipation of 
contributions from donors and NGOs 
• Standard unit costs often need to be revised upwards 
Budget 
Execution 
• Regular on-budget implementation   • Use of off-budget channels, particularly by UN and NGOs  
• Special procurement and/or  disbursement arrangements, 
including procurement agents 
Accounting 
and Reporting 
• Standardized and timely accounting 
and reporting of transactions 
• Emphasis on comprehensiveness and transparency of the 




• A key fiduciary principle is that 
restriction funds are used for the 
purpose for which they were 
intended  
• Both ex ante and ex post controls 
are important to ensure that funds 
are spent on intended purposes 
• Reliance on overly detailed ex ante controls will reduce 
flexibility and may risk delays in implementation   However 
some ex ante controls will be necessary. 
• Ex post audit will be critical for assessing compliance and, in 
conjunction with adequate follow-up measures and 




• Evaluates budget performance 
according to regular budget 
indicators. Examples include fiscal 
deficit, budget realism 
(implementation compared with 
original budget), and disbursement 
ratios 
• Reliable information and analysis are even more critical in 
large reconstruction programs than in regular development 
projects  
• Updates need to be more frequent but real time tracking is 
unrealistic and not needed: quarterly updates of fund flows, 
reconstruction progress and basic economic indicators would 
be a major achievement 
34.  Reconstruction strategy and budget cycle. Whereas securing sufficient 
resource commitments for reconstruction is an obvious priority in the wake of conflict or 
natural disasters, the subsequent speed and integrity of reconstruction is the subject of 
increasing concern. Donors’ commitments are themselves contingent on the assurance 
that resources will be spent well. International agencies, including the World Bank, have 
the credibility to assist in meeting these expectations and influencing other donors for 
fund mobilization. PFM is important because it creates a “credible environment” in 
which donors feel confident to make firm aid commitments and ensures that aid reaches 
the intended beneficiaries, helps governments strengthen fiduciary standards (including 
through demonstration effects), and garners stronger support from civil society 
organizations. 
                                                 
7 See Annex 1 for a full adaptation of the PFM framework to reconstruction programs.  
  1235.  Although core fiduciary principles apply, management, planning, budgeting and 
project implementation often need to follow a different sequence and modalities in order 
to be effective in the early years of reconstruction. There are at least six decisions to take:     
•  Management and institutional set-up. Depending on the scale and location of the 
disaster, the size of the country and the strength of the local institutions, affected 
countries may set up independent reconstruction agencies (see above).   
Alternatively, existing central or sub-national government institutions typically 
coordinate the implementation of the reconstruction program. 
•  Reconstruction planning versus rapid project implementation. A credible plan that 
includes key policy decisions is essential. However, lengthy planning exercises and 
overly detailed reconstruction plans can do more harm than good.  Most 
importantly, the reconstruction process needs to start quickly, particularly to 
provide employment and livelihoods; plans can be readjusted along the way. 
•  On-budget versus off-budget. Fund flow arrangements highlight the tension 
between speed and orderly budget implementation in reconstruction programs. 
International partners have increasingly emphasized the use of country PFM 
systems to channel aid even in reconstruction situations.  However, a large share of 
project implementation may be channeled outside regular budgetary processes, 
particularly if NGOs and the UN system are playing a significant role. This is not a 
major problem per se if a robust monitoring and evaluation system is in place. For 
funds that go through regular budgetary systems, it is critical to introduce a higher 
degree of flexibility and iterations of budgeting to allow for faster disbursements 
and reallocations. However, governments can only achieve such flexible fund 
disbursements if they have already established special fund-flow mechanisms that 
can also be used for the early reconstruction phase.  
•  Front-loading versus back-loading of funds. While quick action is essential, too 
much front-loading of reconstruction funds will likely increase inflation and reduce 
the resources available in the second and third years of reconstruction. The higher 
the share of NGO funding, the more funds the government can program in later 
years because NGO funding tends to be exhausted after two years.  
•  Regular versus special procurement regimes. Reconstruction procurement faces a 
dilemma. On the one hand, standard procurement processes need to be shortened to 
accelerate reconstruction. On the other hand, extra caution is needed because the 
influx of additional resources will put additional strain on the procurement system, 
which was often weak before the disaster. A number of special/streamlined 
procurement arrangements have therefore been used, and a number of countries 
have also used independent procurement agents. 
•  Emphasis on ex ante or ex post controls. Reconstruction needs to strike a forward-
looking balance between signaling a high degree of accountability, while not 
allowing the implementation process to grind to a halt. The key decision is on the 
balance between ex ante and ex post controls. The more rapidly reconstruction 
begins; the more governments need to rely on ex post controls. However, the 
importance of these ex post controls then becomes even more significant than in 
regular development programs.  
  13Monitoring and evaluation 
36.  A typical post-disaster reconstruction episode has a larger and more diverse 
number of development actors than in regular development projects. These include 
central and sub-national governments, special institutions, multi- and bi-laterals donors 
and NGOs. In the case of Aceh and Nias, more than 300 institutions managing more than 
1,500 projects contributed to the reconstruction effort―excluding emergency support. In 
such an environment timely and reliable information is critical, particularly as the 
situation on the ground changes rapidly, which raises the following questions: 
•  What are the most effective systems for capturing comprehensive, timely, and 
consistent information concerning reconstruction spending? 
•  Who should manage and utilize these resources? 
37.  The most appropriate system will again depend on the size of the disaster, the 
number of major players engaged in reconstruction spending, the quality of their own 
reporting, and existing capacity within the agencies tasked with the M&E role.  Special 
care must also be taken that development of the perfect system does not stand in the way 
of an operationally effective system.  Hence details such as proactive data collection and 
analysis protocols, the key audience for regular reporting, and modalities for M&E 
follow-up are likely to be especially critical. There is broad agreement that good PFM 
systems are essential for the implementation of policies and the achievement of 
developmental objectives by supporting aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic allocation of 
resources and efficient service delivery. The PEFA framework also provides benchmarks 
for PFM out-turns (budget credibility), cross-cutting features (comprehensiveness and 
transparency), the budget cycle (policy-based budgeting, predictability and control in 
budget execution, accounting, procurement, recording and reporting, external scrutiny 
and audit), and donor practices. The PEFA framework inspired some of the early actions, 
even in countries with weak capacity. These actions include the establishment of a 
consolidated budget (integrating both capital and recurrent expenditures), attempting to 
consolidate activities of multiple donors and ensuring that forward recurrent costs are 
covered (Sarraf, 2005). 
38.  Reliable information and analysis is even more critical in large reconstruction 
programs than in regular development programs. Multiple resource sources (from 
national governments, donors, NGOs) and implementation streams for reconstruction 
provide a particular challenge in tracking funds and evaluating results. In addition, the 
reconstruction PFM cycle is more compressed and iterative than regular budget cycles. 
The key benchmarks for the M&E system are the production of timely and 
comprehensive estimates of (i) funds allocated and spent (covering all sources from 
domestic, international, public, and private), (ii) reconstruction progress, and (iii) 
economic and social impacts. 
 
  14IV. Country Findings 
39.  The eight natural-disaster country case studies reveal a significant degree of 
diversity in the scale of the reconstruction challenges and implementation modalities. The 
case studies include three post-tsunami countries (Aceh-Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the 
Maldives); three post-earthquake countries (Colombia, Pakistan, Yogyakarta-Indonesia); 
and two post-hurricane countries (Grenada and Honduras). While all experienced severe 
damage/loss from natural disasters, Aceh and Sri Lanka had also suffered damage/loss 
from conflict. The extent of the national and international response, the type of 
intervention, and the institutional and the financing mechanisms all showed significant 
diversity between the eight cases (see Table 5). This exercise relied on a mix of desk 
reviews and interviews with World Bank staff.
8 
                                                 
8 See Annex 2 for a summary of the reconstruction profile in the post-conflict setting. 
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Country  Date of event  The nature and impact of reconstruction 
challenge 
Date of Damage 
& Loss or Needs 
Assessment 
Donor Conference (Date, 







The signing of peace 
agreement: August 
15, 2005 
The impact of the tsunami: 
• 130,000 people killed  
• Damaged &  losses: US$4.5 billion 
• Impact on economy:  97% of Province GDP 
or 2% of national GDP 
The impact of the conflict:  
• 15,000 killed by conflict 
 
January 18, 2005 
• Jakarta, January 19, 2005 
• Donor pledges: US$5.1 





5.9 Richter scale 
earthquake: May 27, 
2006 
• More than 5,700 people killed 
• Damage & losses: US$ 3.1 billion 
• Impact on economy: 14% of Yogyakarta and 
Central Java province GDP or 1.3% of 
national GDP 
June 12, 2006  • Jakarta, June 14, 2006 (CGI 
Meeting) 






 Conflict: Ongoing 
The impact of tsunami: 
• 35,322 people killed 
• Damage &  losses: US$2.2 billion 
• Impact on economy: 7.6% of GDP 
The impact of conflict: 
• After more than 20 years of conflict: 
displaced 390,000 people  
January 10, 2005, 
The report was 
released on 
February 2, 2005 
• Jakarta, January 19, 2005 
• Donor pledges: US$2.1 





• 29,000 people displaced 
• Damage &  losses : US$470 million 
• Impact on economy: 62% of GDP 
Early January 
2005, The report 
was released on 
February 8, 2005 
• Jakarta, January 19, 2005 
• Donor pledges: US$302 
billion (grants & loans) 
Pakistan 
7.8 Richter scale 
Earthquake: October 
8, 2005 
• 73,000 people death 
• Damage & losses: US$5.2 billion 
• Impact on economy: 0.4% of GDP (excl. 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir/ AJK) 
November 12, 
2005 
• Islamabad, November 19, 
2005. 
• Donor pledges: US$5.9 
billion (grant & loan) 
Colombia 
6.2 Richter scale 
earthquake: January 
25, 1999 
• 1,185 people killed 
• Damage &  losses: US$ 1.86 billion 
• Impact on economy: 2.2% of GDP 
April 1999  • None 
Grenada 
Hurricane Ivan: 
September 7, 2004 
• Damaged 80% of public and private 
infrastructure 
• Damage &  losses: US$800 million 
• Impact on economy: 200% of GDP 
September 13, 
2004 
• Washington, DC, October 4, 
2004. The actual pledging 
took place in Grenada on 
November 19, 2004 




October 25 – 
November 1, 1998 
• 5,757 dead, 12,272 injured and 8,058 
reported missing 
• Damage & losses: US$3.6 billion, 
reconstruction cost was estimated at US$ 5 
billion 
• Impact on economy: 74% of GDP 
December 10, 
1998 
• Stockholm, June 30, 1999.  
• Total pledges US$ 2.8 
billion,  
40.  For comparative purposes, this paper also draws on purely post-conflict 
examples in Afghanistan, East Timor, South Sudan, and Haiti. While East Timor’s 
destruction was largely inflicted by human hand, it was of short duration. Such intensity 
can be compared with recent events in Lebanon, where destruction was concentrated in a 
  16short period akin to a natural disaster. In contrast, South Sudan’s destruction as a result of 
civil war was far more protracted. 
41.  The exact nature and scope of the reconstruction challenge, combined with the 
country context, may contain important situational differences.  Important considerations 
include: (a) the scale of international aid (public/private), (b) how much aid was 
channeled on-budget, (c) the country’s institutional and budget arrangements, (d) how aid 
coordination was handled, (e) whether there were cross-cutting arrangements (e.g., multi 
donor trust fund), (f) how comprehensive and timely was reporting on commitments, 
fulfilled commitments, and actual implementation/disbursement, (g) how many 
institutional levels were involved in the PFM cycle, (h) the financial arrangements for 
emergency relief and longer-term recovery, (i) what were the implementation 
arrangements, and (j) how fiduciary integrity/anti-corruption was managed for the 
various funding flows (including internal and external audit). These elements influence 
bottlenecks and the results achieved in the reconstruction process. 
Institutional arrangements: Special agencies, central or local implementation? 
42.  All case studies involved the establishment of some type of special institutional 
arrangements, for example a coordination body or special agency, to promote 
reconstruction. However, the extent to which these bodies engaged in coordination, 
monitoring, and even implementation differed. All special agencies were given special 
roles in coordinating and monitoring, although other agents have often been left in charge 
of implementation. The organizational structures of these special agencies also differ. A 
special agency can be centralized or decentralized while a coordination body typically 
has a centralized structure. 
43.  With the exception of the Maldives and Yogyakarta-Indonesia, all case-study 
countries affected by natural disasters set up special reconstruction agencies. The post-
conflict countries were also governed by special governance structures, either interim 
governments or a special power-sharing agreement as in the case of Sudan (Table 6). All 
of the reconstruction agencies were assigned coordinating and monitoring functions, 
while the implementing tasks were mostly performed by the existing government line 
agencies or NGOs. Indonesia (Aceh & Nias) and Pakistan represent special cased where 
the reconstruction agencies received implementing authority.  
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Country  Type of 
event 













August 15, 2005 
Decentralized Special Agency 
(Badan Rehabilitasi dan 
Rekonstruksi/BRR). In the first 





and local government, 
donors, NGOs  
Indonesia 
(Yogya) 
Earthquake  May 27, 2006  Centralized Coordination Board 
(Tim Teknis National), 
coordinated by Coordinating 










Centralized Special Agency 





donors, NGOs  
Maldives  Tsunami  December 26, 2004  Centralized Coordination Board 
(National Disaster Management 
Center/NMDC) 
Central government, 
donors, NGOs  
Colombia Earthquake  January  25,  1999 Decentralized  Special  Agency 
(Reconstruction Fund for the 
Coffee Region/FOREC) 
Local government and 
NGOs 
Pakistan  Earthquake  October 5, 2005  Decentralized Special Agency 
(Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Authority/ERRA) 
Provincial and local 
government, military, 
partner organization 
(PO), donors, NGOs 
Grenada  Hurricane 
Ivan 
September 7, 2004  Centralized Special Agency 
(Agency for Reconstruction and 
Development/ARD) 
Central government, 
donors, NGOs, and 
external partners  
Honduras Hurricane 
Mitch 
Oct 25 – Nov 1, 
1998 
Centralized Special Agency 
(COPECO (Permanent 
Commission for Contingencies)) 
Central government,  
provincial and local 
government, donors, 
NGOs 
44.  Colombia developed an innovative management model for managing 
reconstruction that has proved very successful. The reconstruction agency, FOREC, was 
established to coordinate the reconstruction of the coffee region (Eje Cafetero) in 
Colombia between 1999 and 2002. It had a decentralized management structure with a 
clear distinction between national and local government functions. Its role was centered 
on coordinating and monitoring the overall recovery operation. Project implementation 
was carried out by NGOs at zonal management offices in 32 reconstruction zones 
through a competitive selection process. This model had been successful in ensuring 
public participation, and social control and transparency by contracting project 
                                                 
9 The experience of India’s post-tsunami reconstruction was not part of the 8 case studies. However, in both 
cases, the national governments decided to empower the sub-national governments to lead the 
reconstruction process. 
  18monitoring to a consortium of universities, while ensuring that the funds were 
administered by a fiduciary agency (World Bank, 2003).
10 
45.  Nonetheless, FOREC also faced a number of institutional challenges, 
demonstrating that a specialized agency with a deconcentrated operating structure can 
only be fully effective if it maximizes local cooperation. The exclusion of local 
governments from project identification and implementation resulted in their lack of full 
cooperation. Institutional capacity and technical skills were dissimilar across the 32 zone 
managers, resulting in implementation divergences in some areas. This decentralized 
function also created challenges with coordination and information collection.  
46.  In such exceptional conditions, where there is a small state with strong central 
government leadership, a centralized reconstruction management structure is most 
feasible. The Maldives created a centralized coordination board, the National Disaster 
Management Center (NDMC) led by Ministry of Defense, to manage and coordinate the 
relief effort and reconstruction process. In addition, the Government of Maldives created 
several task forces (e.g., national economic recovery and reconstruction programming, 
aid management) to coordinate the implementation under coordination of NDMC. On the 
other hand, after Hurricane Ivan that severely damaged Grenada (with damaged valued at 
twice the national GDP), the government established a separate agency with a centralized 
organizational structure to oversee the reconstruction effort. 
47.  With two big natural disasters in a row, Indonesia presents a unique case for 
reconstruction management. The government established a special agency (BRR) with a 
centralized structure initially to manage and expedite the reconstruction in Aceh and 
Nias. BRR was confronted with serious delays in the first year, having difficulty in 
implementing and overseeing projects outside the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. The 
BRR subsequently decided to decentralize its offices in the second year to work hand-in-
hand with local government to improve and better integrate with local government 
planning and avoid duplication. Unlike Aceh, the government established a coordination 
body in response to the Yogyakarta earthquake, under the Coordinating Ministry for the 
Economy. This body has a coordination role at the central and policy level. The 
implementation, monitoring and coordination on the ground were carried out by 
provincial and local governments.  
48.  The reconstruction of Yogyakarta is considered as one of the most successful 
recent reconstruction episodes with more than 100,000 houses built within one year. 
About 75 percent of the reconstruction financing was provided by the central government 
and only about 15 percent by the international community.  
49.  In exceptional cases, when official government structures are weak or non-
existent, the UN has acted as an interim government. The UN has been called upon to 
take a leadership role in several post conflict cases including East Timor, Afghanistan, 
and Haiti. The UN administered the transitional government and managed the initial 
                                                 
10 The United Nations awarded FOREC the Sasakawa Prize on October 11, 2000 for its accomplishment in 
helping to prevent or reduce the risk from natural disasters.  
  19phase of reconstruction, while at the same time ensuring that the government system 
continued to function. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) helped to 
stabilize the security situation and led humanitarian assistance in southern Sudan while 
the long term recovery process was coordinated through Core Coordination Group 
(CCG). In East Timor, the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor 
(UNTAET) acted as the coordination and monitoring agent. The implementation function 
was largely carried out by international donors and I/NGOs, with a limited role for local 
governments.
11 
50.  Institutional arrangements for reconstruction depend on the scale of the disaster 
and country context. Special reconstruction agencies are only a second best solution. The 
best solution is strong local governments managing reconstruction supported by central 
government agencies. However, in most developing countries special reconstruction 
agencies are often the only feasible option when strong local governments with a proven 
track record in reconstruction are absent.  
51.  The size of the country and magnitude of disaster are also important factors in 
deciding on the set-up of special agencies. The 2004 tsunami created devastation on an 
epic scale in Indonesia (Aceh) and Sri Lanka, and even functioning local governments 
had difficulty shouldering the reconstruction effort. In Aceh, the situation was 
compounded by decades of conflict, weak local governments and a remote central 
government. India, with strong delivery system at the local level in the affected areas and 
less severe impact compared with Indonesia and Sri Lanka, empowered sub-national 
governments to lead the reconstruction. By contrast, the Maldives, a small country with 
an experienced government, managed the reconstruction process through existing central 
government systems despite the relative magnitude of the tsunami on the country’s 
economy.  
Financing and execution arrangements 
52.  A central feature of reconstruction experience is its reliance on multiple sources 
of support. Government, multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental agencies all 
contribute to the reconstruction process.  For example, in Aceh, Sri Lanka, East Timor 
and Afghanistan, international donors and non-governmental actors played a significant 
role in the initial relief/rehabilitation process.   
53.  The mix of public and private funds differs from case to case. The tsunami 
triggered one of the largest mobilizations of private funds in development history.  People 
and governments around the world participated in an unprecedented act of global 
solidarity. Private contributions reached record highs estimated at more than US$10 
billion for emergency support and reconstruction programs. In Aceh and Sri Lanka, the 
NGO sector became one of the main contributors to the reconstruction efforts, and its 
funds have financed most of the existing reconstruction activities so far. In Aceh alone 
                                                 
11 For example, in Afghanistan and East Timor a lack of capacity has meant that day-to-day budget 
activities are carried out by international consultants (see Dorotinsky and Pradhan). 
  20NGOs are implementing programs worth almost US$2 billion (end April 2006) and are 
expected to finance about 30 percent of the total reconstruction program.  
54.  In weak and/or cumbersome governance arrangements, off-budget channels 
(partially through NGOs) seem to be critical in the early phase of reconstruction. In Aceh 
and East Timor, mobilization of the private sector and NGOs at the initial stages 
combined with community development-driven reconstruction achieved rapid results on 
the ground and also increased community participation (e.g., cash-for-work programs). 
55.  NGOs (and, within limits, the UN) can react faster to deliver emergency 
supplies and reconstruction in their sectors of comparative advantage (often social 
sectors). Classical (and larger) donors and national governments (depending on their 
levels of income) are slower but have a comparative advantage in bulky, large-scale and 
complex investments, particularly in infrastructure.   
56.  Due to their specialization and comparative advantage, NGOs and many donors 
can pre-program their funds very rapidly. This early planning and programming helps 
implementation. However, the complexities of reconstruction and the numerous players 
can create special challenges for project coordination and management, especially in 
situations where off-budget arrangements are prominent. It is critical that sufficient 
fungible funds remain available for reconstruction gap-filling and development programs 
in the second reconstruction phase.  
57.  Fungible funding is also equally important in addressing regional and sectoral 
gaps, especially in environment where many donors and NGOs have pre-programmed 
their projects and have specialties in certain sectors. The domestic government and major 
donors seem to have more interest in providing flexibility and fungible funding. One year 
after the tsunami, in Aceh and Maldives social sectors such as health and education were 
favored and received large financial assistance that exceeded their identified needs. On 
the other hand, large-scale infrastructure projects (such as transport, housing, and 
electricity) received less attention and remained under-funded. 
58.  Joint financing arrangements such as MDTFs have been used by most countries 
to improve the coordination and effectiveness of reconstruction processes. This model is 
important in situations where the bulk of resources come from bilateral and multilateral 
donors. The World Bank has been both a trustee and administrator of MDTFs. In addition 
to enhancing effectiveness of coordination, this arrangement increases donor confidence 
by providing assistance where fiduciary systems of a country are weak. 
59.  Associated with special agencies on the side of the recipient country, MDTFs 
have been an important instrument in resource mobilization, policy dialogue, and risk and 
information management (see recent review of 18 MDTFs in post-crisis post-disaster and 
post-conflict reconstruction, Scanteam, 2007). Since MDTFs frequently operate in high-
risk and high-cost environments, they require flexible and adequate funding to enable 
effective and rapid responses to dynamic situations on the ground. MDTFs offer some 
advantages for national governments and donors in the post-crisis environment. They can 
increase and mobilize financial assistance and provide political visibility for the national 
  21authorities. Donors can operate in a more effective and efficient manner by reducing 
information, coordination and administration costs under joint financing arrangements. 
While MDTFs can be an effective tool in levering collective donor influence, they also 
entail less visibility for each individual donor (Scanteam, 2007). 
60.  There are a limited number of cases where the government manages such joint 
financing arrangements. This requires sound government budget systems and a number of 
fiduciary risk-measurement indicators to be in place to ensure accountability and 
transparency, and to establish donor confidence. The Maldives established an MDTF 
administered by the government, while in Pakistan the government there dedicated a 
single-basket account as a reconstruction fund, which is managed by its reconstruction 
agency. 
61.  International donors also have their own financing instruments and procedures 
in responding to crises and emergency situations. The UN typically announces Flash 
Appeals (fund-raising) for international solidarity both from public and private donors. 
Immediately following Indian Ocean tsunami on December 26, 2004, the UN raised 
almost US$1 billion for the first six months emergency assistance. The World Bank has 
responded with relative flexibility to emergency needs with a variety of projects and 
activities. In addition to its non-lending emergency assistance, the World Bank has 
increasingly used Emergency Recovery Loans (ERLs) and re-allocation funds from 
existing projects in response to emergency needs with accelerated approval processes. 
Moreover, the World Bank has introduced disaster insurance schemes to assist mainly 
small states that are prone to disasters, enabling them to obtain immediate financial 
assistance following natural disasters. 
62.  Post-conflict reconstruction poses a special challenge in financial management 
given the insecure environment. Weak administrative procedures and national budget 
systems simultaneously receiving large external financial assistance may cause the 
diversion of investments away from national development priorities. Often, governments 
do not have adequate capacity to coordinate and monitor pledges, expenditures or 
outcomes. In such settings, joint donor financing instruments such as MDTFs can play a 
vital role in consolidating external finances, and improving coordination and 
effectiveness in implementation. Sudan presents a special case: the Government of Sudan 
and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreed to create two MDTFs 
administered by the World Bank to provide equitable access to external assistance for 
development. 
63.  In East Timor, donor financing arrangements were complex and channeled 
through four different mechanisms: the UN humanitarian consolidated appeal, the 
UNTAET budget, the CFET-UN administered trust fund, and the TFET-World Bank 
administered trust fund (Cliffe and Rohland, 2002). This complexity of aid financing 
coordination created barriers to national ownership of the reconstruction planning process 
and prevented the integration of all funding sources into the national budget. 
64.  Successful reconstruction processes include responsiveness to needs/effective 
prioritization, timeliness, cost-effectiveness (given time constraints), and the assurance 
  22that funds will be spent on their intended purpose in a timely manner (including the 
suitable management of corruption risks). Key benchmarks that PFM systems can 
influence in a significant way are: timely credible information, timely and equitably 
implementation, and efforts to minimize corruption (Table 7). The design and 
implementation of PFM systems will contribute to achieving these results but they are not 
the single determinant. Many other factors also come into play, particularly the 
availability of resources, the availability and price of construction materials, the capacity 
to manage and implement reconstruction programs, and the level of coordination between 
all reconstruction parties.   
Table 7. Selected performance criteria for reconstruction PFM 









• Comprehensive financial 
information 
• Physical progress 
• Critical in reconstruction 
contexts given the need for 
timely information on:  
(i) Financial flows (govt, 
donors, NGOs) 
(ii) Physical progress 
(iii) Economic and social 
impact 
Information piecemeal, tendency to 
highlight easy information, including 







• Timely implementation of 
reconstruction according to 
prioritization: 
(i) Timely allocations: 
planning 
(ii) Timely commitments: 
procurement and contracting 
(ii) Timely implementation: 
disbursements 
• Speed of implementation 
• Disbursement pattern 
• Transition between emergency 
and recovery 
 
The tension between quick action 
and careful planning has been 
inherent in all reconstruction 
episodes. In particular when setting 
up reconstruction agencies (e.g. 
Aceh, Pakistan) there is a trade off 
between slowing down 
reconstructions in the early phase in 
exchange for a more cohesive 




Equity in implementation of 
reconstruction 
• Sectoral allocations and gaps 
• Urban versus rural allocations 
 
Evidence that reconstruction was 
bunched in capital 
Rural/low capacity areas may be 




Effective management of 
fiduciary risk/corruption 
minimized 
• Were effective safeguards in 
place? 
• Did these vary significantly 
across funding flows? 
• Was an effective balance 
struck between speed of 
implementation and 
management of fiduciary risk? 
In Aceh, the reconstruction agency 
cancelled a number of projects 
considered to have unfair bidding 
processes. There is evidence that 
some government officials are 
reluctant to be project managers due 
to tight anti-corruption procedures. 
This slowed implementation. 
 
65.  Experience reveals a trade-off between swiftness and national ownership 
(capacity building) in reconstruction implementation. Physical reconstruction is to some 
extent less problematic and faster to implement than institutional and capacity building. 
  23Sequencing is critical in the situation of both low institutional capacity and widespread 
needs. In East Timor, sectors that made progress in establishing institutions and strong 
levels of management capacity such as health were often slower initially in achieving 
physical reconstruction targets, but considerably more successful in building institutional 
capacity (Cliffe and Rohland, 2002). 
66.  In post-conflict situations, security remains a major challenge in the recovery 
process. In Afghanistan, implementation of the development program has been 
constrained by poor security conditions. In many cases, despite the rapid approval of 
projects and budget allocations from donors and government, implementation itself has 
been slow. In addition, limited capacity in line ministries in the area of procurement and 
financial management has been the major problem faced by Afghanistan. In East Timor, 
the implementation of large reconstruction projects was slow largely due to difficulties in 
managing standard procurement procedures in a post-conflict context. 
67.  There has been increasing concern over the equitable distribution of funds. The 
most accessible areas, usually the regional capital, invariably receive more funding than 
they need. Conversely, isolated areas often lag behind in funding. In Aceh, there has been 
a bias towards the areas closer to the capital city, Banda Aceh, which received double its 
needs. Similarly in Grenada, the urban areas recovered faster, benefiting from on-going 
construction boom, while the population depending on agriculture had difficulty 
returning to normality. In Afghanistan, poor security prevented donors and NGOs from 
providing assistance to isolated areas, thus centering reconstruction in Kabul. Although 
the Government of Sri Lanka has given special attention to ensure all tsunami-affected 
communities receive equal access to recovery assistance, the security constraints and 
capacity gaps have slowed the recovery in northeast Sri Lanka, which is also a conflict-
affected area. 
68.  To conclude, several important lessons can be learned from the implementation 
of MDTFs with regard to financing and execution arrangements. First, it seems clear that 
MDTFs worked well both in post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction (Aceh, 
Yogyakarta, and Afghanistan), while fragmented donor financing mechanisms are 
usually less effective (East Timor). Second, a balance needs to be found between the use 
of off-budget and on-budget funding. Off-budget channels (partially through NGOs) have 
proven to be effective in the early phase of reconstruction, especially in weak governance 
systems (Aceh and East Timor). This is because NGOs (and the UN) can often react 
faster to deliver emergency supplies and reconstruction in their sectors of comparative 
advantage (often social sectors). More traditional (and larger) donors and national 
governments (depending on their levels of income) are slower but have a comparative 
advantage in bulky, large-scale and complex investments, particularly in infrastructure. 
Third, fungible funding is important for the second phase of reconstruction, with 
government funds filling the gap. Fourth, sequencing is critical in situations where there 
is both low institutional capacity and widespread needs. Therefore, a balance needs to be 
struck between swiftness and capacity building. Finally, remote areas often do not have 
equitable access to resources and, as a consequence, require special attention and 
monitoring.   
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Monitoring and evaluation 
69.  Financing is likely to come from multiple sources. Timely and consistent 
tracking of budgets/commitments and execution is a critical ingredient for assessing 
reconstruction progress. Financial information is especially sensitive, particularly if 
donors and private contributions are high. An on-going assessment of commitments and 
disbursements across all sources (public/private, domestic/international) would highlight 
the extent of any reconstruction delays and potential financing gaps. Good PFM systems 
would then measure whether the financial resources are being translated into outcomes. 
When execution is decentralized across various types of domestic or international 
agencies or local governments, data systems need to pay particular attention to proper 
accounting. For instance, commitments need to be separated from disbursements, 
emergency projects from reconstruction projects, and financing institutions from 
implementing partners (Agustina, 2007).    
70.  In recent years, several “tracking systems” have been developed to monitor 
financial information and improve aid management of the recovery process.  The 
existence of credible and integrated financial tracking systems has become more critical 
in recent years because of the unprecedented levels of funding after the tsunami, together 
with other large-scale post-conflict reconstrucion efforts (e.g. Afghanistan and Sudan) 
with large funding.  
71.  The most prominent aid management and reconstruction tracking instrument is 
the Development Assistance Database (DAD). The DAD has been applied in a number of 
countries including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia. However, 
coverage has been limited, often focusing on UN and other core donor activities. 
Although the DAD includes sophisticated technical specifications, including visual 
breakdowns to the village level, it has faced many implementation challenges, 
particularly in Aceh and Nias.  
72.  While information technology has sometimes been an impediment to the 
effective implementation of information systems, it has typically not been the main 
obstacle for effective monitoring. Instead, the main challenges are related to data 
collection and analysis: 
•  In Aceh and Nias, a labor intensive data collection effort by a joint team of the 
World Bank (mainly national staff) and the reconstruction agency has proven 
superior to DAD’s more high-tech and self-entry-based information system in 
tracking funds. The Indonesia DAD―a more than US$2 million investment―has 
yet to deliver any significant results.  
•  In Sri Lanka, DAD has been providing regular financial and project updates. 
Similar to Aceh and Nias, this system also builds on self-entry-based information. 
In order to increase compliance, the DAD team also discloses the institutions not 
providing data.  
  2573.  Future technical assistance should pay particular attention to more basic but 
effective systems. For example, the DAD system relies mainly on self-entry. A better but 
an admittedly more labor-intensive approach is to engage in proactive collection from 
key players. Furthermore, rather than focusing on excessive detail, a more 
straightforward classification system that focuses on the core sectors of the damage/loss 
assessment would generate more workable systems.   
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74.  This paper has sought to offer an initial stock-take of post-disaster 
reconstruction experience. The existing country experiences highlight three main lessons: 
(i) Reconstruction agencies are often the only workable institutional arrangement, 
particularly in large-scale disasters, notwithstanding high risks and mixed experiences; 
(ii) The core principles of good PFM still apply, but all funding does not necessarily need 
to be channeled through country systems if the regular budget cycle does not allow for a 
speedy and flexible implementation;  and (iii) good information and communication are 
the secret to successful reconstruction but are rarely found.  
Reconstruction agencies are often the only workable institutional arrangement, 
particularly in large-scale disasters. 
75.  The optimal choice of institutional arrangements depends on the three key 
factors: (i) scale and scope of the disaster and reconstruction program, (ii) the location of 
the disaster, and (iii) the pre-existing capacity of local agencies.  If the nature of the 
disaster and the corresponding reconstruction program is large, the location remote and 
local institutions weak (Aceh/Nias, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) then the need for a special 
agency with a strong coordination and implementation function is great.  If local 
institutions are strong and the logistical reconstruction challenges manageable within the 
existing structures, then the existing institutions have proven to be sufficient to manage 
the reconstruction program, even if damage, losses and the resulting reconstruction 
program were substantial (Maldives and Yogyakarta). 
76.  Independent reconstruction agencies with substantial powers are only a second-
best solution, but often there is no better choice because existing institutions may have 
even more difficulty managing the reconstruction process successfully. Once these 
agencies are set up there are inevitable tensions with existing institutions. The most 
critical periods are at the beginning and the end, reflecting the two essential transitions of 
the reconstruction process: from relief to reconstruction, and from reconstruction to 
development. 
The core principles of good PFM still apply, but all funding does not necessarily 
need to be channeled through country systems if the regular budget cycle does not 
allow for a speedy and flexible implementation.  
77.  The need for strengthening and supporting existing country systems is a core 
theme of current development thinking. Reconstruction is different and should be part of 
this important target for regular development programs. There are three main reasons to 
embark on more flexible and unconventional PFM arrangements. First, speed is of the 
highest importance particularly in the early reconstruction period. As other actors will 
react speedily, the conditions on the ground change fast and often make any longer-term 
planning obsolete. Second, disasters rarely happen at a moment when budgetary needs 
can easily be integrated into the budget process. Third, the reconstruction process may 
also entail a significant scaling-up of spending in areas where existing government 
agencies do not have an established track record or comparative advantage (e.g. housing, 
private sector development). The traditional government institutions often do not have the 
necessary expertise in these sectors because they are not designed for public intervention 
in normal circumstances. 
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78.  Assuring fiduciary integrity in such a fluid reconstruction environment is the 
true challenge and inevitably entails tradeoffs. While on-budget arrangements are 
preferred for long-term development, off-budget mechanisms have been effective in 
responding to emergency needs and allowing for more flexibility in rapidly changing 
circumstances. Coordination and integrated monitoring of projects should avoid any 
overlap and waste of resources. Hence, associated PFM sequencing needs to identify core 
emergency procedures and minimal functionality to avoid implementation delays. Rather 
than waiting to put in place a fully fledged system and comprehensive planning strategy, 
critical projects require emergency modalities, including the use of off-budget channels. 
79.  There is a natural burden-sharing among the different parties in the 
reconstruction process between the first and the second half of the reconstruction 
program. In the early phase, many players, particularly NGOs, bilateral donors and the 
UN, dedicate their funds to specific sectors and focus on the early reconstruction phase. 
At a later stage, fungible resources for reconstruction and development are very 
important. The affected governments or larger multilateral donors or MDTFs have a 
comparative advantage in providing these fungible programs.   
Good information and communication are the secret of successful reconstruction 
but these rarely exist. 
80.  The combination of large amounts of funding and the need for rapid action 
creates an environment where reliable evaluation and monitoring is even more critical 
than in regular development programs. In many cases, monitoring and evaluation are not 
conducted comprehensively. Instead, most M&E systems only focus on the coordinating 
agency’s own performance rather than the recovery and reconstruction performance as a 
whole. 
81.  Many important decisions, particularly funding decisions, are taken at short 
notice and are based on weak information. A comprehensive accounting and reporting 
mechanism that covers both off- and on-government budget contributions is critical to 
help plan and manage the use of the reconstruction program. Off-budget funds, 
particularly from NGOs, are often not part of the overall accounting and reporting system 
and special arrangements are needed to capture these off-budget flows (e.g. project 
approval workshops). Reliable data, both comprehensive and detailed, become equally 
vital, even from a legal dimension, when reconstruction and other agencies at the end of 
their existence are handing over their assets to local authorities. 
82.  However, when governments and donors have made an effort to establish 
comprehensive monitoring systems through complex IT-systems, the results have been 
mostly disappointing. Despite ambitious pronouncements, existing high-tech systems 
such as the UN’s DAD have as yet not been able to provide timely and credible 
information that can be used for policy decisions. The experience of the reconstruction 
effort in Aceh, Nias and Yogyakarta shows that relatively low-tech, labor-intensive data 
collection and analysis based on a robust methodology is superior to technologically 
advanced and self-entry based information systems. The successful monitoring systems 
have collected and communicated the results of the tracking effort in regular intervals, 
e.g. three-month cycles for the first two years in the case of Aceh and Nias.   29
Annex 1   Framework: Conventional and Post-Disaster/Post-Conflict PFM Cycle 
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 Annex 2: Key facts and institutional arrangement of post-conflict country cases  
 
Table 1: Post-conflict country case: key facts 
 
Country  Date of event  The nature and impact of 
reconstruction challenge 
Date of Damage & 




Mass violence and clash 
between pro-Indonesia and pro-
independence groups after 
referendum in Aug 30, 1999  
• Displaced 75% of population and 
destroyed 70% of infrastructure 
• Need assessment: US$307 million 
• Impact on economy: 40-45% drop in 
GDP 
Oct-Nov 1999  Tokyo, Dec 1999 
Donor pledges: US$366 
million 
Afghanistan 
The fall of the Taliban regime 
on October 2001 
• Millions of people displaced 
• Needs assessment: US$14.6 b (10 
years) 
• GDP 2002 : US$4.4 billion 
January 2002  Tokyo, Jan 21-22, 2002 
Donor pledges: US$5.1 
billion 
Haiti 
The fall of Aristide’s regime on 
February 29, 2004 after over 
two decades of conflict  
• 65% of population below poverty line 
• Needs assessment: US$1.4 billion 
• Impact on economy: 5.5% of GDP 




Washington DC, July 
19-20, 2004. 
Donor pledges: US$1.5 
billion 
South 
Sudan  The signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 
2005 after 21 years of civil war 
• 2 million people killed and more than 
4 million people displaced 
• Needs: US$3.6 billion (or US$8 
billion in total) 
 
Dec, 2003 - March 
18, 2005 (Joint 
Assessment Mission) 
Oslo, April 2005 
Donor pledges: US$4.5 
billion 
 
Table 2: Institutional arrangement of post-conflict country cases 
Country  Type of 
event 
Date of Event  Type of Institutional Arrangements  Implementing 
agency(ies)  
East Timor  Conflict  August 30, 1999 
(Referendum) 
Interim government 1999-2002 (The United Nation 




Afghanistan Conflict  October  2001   
(The fall of 
Taliban regime) 
Interim government 2002-2004 supported by The 
United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) and Coordination Agency (Afghanistan 
Assistance Coordination Authority/AACA) 
Interim government, 
donors, NGO 
Haiti  Conflict  February 29, 2004 
(The fall of 
Aristide’s regime) 
Interim Government 2004-2006 supported by United 
Nation peacekeeping mission (Mission des Nations 
Unies pour la Stabilization en Haiti – MINUSTAH) 
Interim government, 
donors, NGOs  
South 
Sudan 
Conflict  January 9, 2005 




Interim government with power sharing agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan's 
People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLAM/A) The 
presence of the UN (the United Nations Mission in 
the Sudan/UNMIS) and Core Coordination Group 
(CCG) as coordination mechanism.  
Interim government, 
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